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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Judgment and Order of Commitment to the
Utah State Prison were signed by the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson on November
8th, 2001 and entered by the Clerk of the Court on November 9th' 2001.

See also

Section 78-2A-3(e) Utah Code Annotated, conferring jurisdiction on this Court.
The Notice of Appeal was filed on November 15th, 2001, within 30 days of
the entry of judgment. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, this appeal is timely.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues presented for appeal are as follows:
I.

Did the trial court err in allowing excessive courtroom security
including allowing Fernandez to be shackled?
This issue is reviewed with close scrutiny to assess whether the

shackles were the intrusive security measure necessary. Cf Williams v.
Estelle, 435 U.S. 501, 504-5 (1976) (courts should review inherently
prejudicial trial circumstances such as prison garb on the Defendant with
close scrutiny.); State v. Gardner, 789 P 2d 273, 281 (Utah 1989), affirming
presence of security personnel as the least intrusive means of providing
security, cert denied 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
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II.

Did the trial court err in denying the for-cause challenges of
potential jurors?
In reviewing the trial courts granting or denial of challenges for

cause to prospective jurors, the Court reviews for abuse of discretion. See
e.g., State v. Bishop, 753 P 2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Menzies, 889 P. 2d 393 (Utah), cert denied 513 U.S. 1115
(1995).
IIL

Did the trial court err in denying the motions for mistrial stemming
from the introduction of evidence concerning Fernandez's status as a
lock-down inmate contrary to a ruling in limine to exclude?
This issue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Widdson, 28 P. 3d 1278, 1290 (Utah 2001); State v. De Corso, 993
P. 2d 837, (Utah 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1164.

IV.

Did the trial court err in refusing to order a presentence report and in
Fernandez to serve consecutive prison terms?
The standard of review for sentencing decisions is an abuse of
discretion. State v. Galli, 967 P. 2d 930 (Utah 1998).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of Utah provides, in relevant part,
that:
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In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel...to be confronted by the
witnesses against him... and the right to appeal in all cases...The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.
Amendment Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States provides, in
relevant part, that:
No State shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of law.

Utah Code Section 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part, that:
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant
shall be acquitted.
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are determinative of
this appeal and are set forth in the addendum to this brief: Utah Code Section 64-13-20,
Utah Code Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Section 76-8-418, Utah Rules of Evidence 401,
402,403, and 404.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

Mr. Fernandez case parallels that of his co-defendant Joseph Madsen, with
the exception that Mr. Madsen has an additional charge and conviction for Class B
Misdemeanor theft. Mr. Fernandez and Mr. Madsen were charged at the same
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time and had their preliminary hearing and trial together. Mr. Madsen has a
companion appeal # 2001092-CA.
Mr. Fernandez appeals from his conviction following a jury trial of Damage
of a Jail, a Third Degree Felony in violation of Section 76-8-418 U.C.A.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

Mr. Fernandez was charged in a one count Information with the above
charge. (R-3). He was bound over after a preliminary hearing on October 15th,
2001. A consolidated jury trial with co-defendant Madsen was held on October
31 st , 2001.
Fernandez was convicted.

C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.

Sentencing was on November 5th, 2001. Defendant was sentenced to a term
in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five years.

His sentence is to run

consecutively with the sentence he is already serving. (See Judgment and Order of
Commitment-Appendix).

D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Mr. Fernandez and Mr. Madsen were inmates in the San Juan County Jail
on September 17th, 2001 (TR-82) (References designated "TR-" refer to the page
4

number of Volume I of the official court transcript of the case.) At the beginning
of his shift on the date, Corrections Officer James Meyer was shown Polaroid
pictures of Fernandez's cell (TR-82, 3). Jail staff believed these pictures might
have been taken with a camera that had been taken from booking (TR-83).
Later Meyer observed Fernandez place his arms into the tray slot of
Madsen's cell and saw flashes. Believing that they were using the camera Meyer
went to investigate 9TR-84).
Madsen's cell was searched and the camera, three Polaroid photos of
Madsen and a new roll of film were found in Madsen's pants (TR-86,8).
Meyer locked Madsen down and searched Fernandez's cell. Meyer found
hair oil, clothing belonging to another inmate, sharpened safety scissors, and
excessive prescription medication. He confiscated these items (TR-89).
As a result of these actions both inmates made threats.

Fernandez

threatened to do something stupid and hurt one of the officers (TR-89). He did not
threaten to damage the jail (TR-89; 109).
Madsen threatened to strangle Meyer and to flood the jail (TR-89-91).
Meyer determined to move Fernandez to a different cell (TR-91). He
examined the new cell including flushing the toilet (TR-92-93). Meyer did not
check the plumbing in Madsen's room and did not know whether the toilet was
working or not (TR-116).
Approximately an hour and one half to an hour and forty-five minutes later
Meyer was advised by Dispatch that water was coming off the tier where
5

Fernandez and Madsen were housed and flowing into the day room (TR-94). He
returned to that area and found that only Fernandez and Madsen's cells were
flooded and had full toilets (TR-94-6).
Madsen's toilet had been clogged with some rags, pieces of underwear, a
piece of a T-shirt and the orange part of a jump suit (TR-99). These items were
admitted as Exhibit 3. Mr. Madsen's toilet was clogged with a laundry bag,
admitted as Exhibit 2.
The items could have been in the toilet for a lengthy period before they
would have wadded enough or moved to create a clog (TR-148). In fact, the
laundry bag that was not the type issued to him as a state inmate. It was a county
inmate bag in Fernandez's possession when he checked his room shortly before
the flooding (TR-114).
No other inmates had access to the cells shortly before the flooding (TR172).
Fernandez exercised his Constitutional right not to testify, Madsen did
testify. Madsen testified that he did not flood it (TR-195). He did not put the
items in his toilet and was unaware who had (TR-197). His toilet had been
sluggish earlier (TR-196).

He had tried to alert jail staff about the flooding

pushing his intercom button and by waving (TR-204).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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1.

Allowing the Defendants to be shackled and permitted uniformed

armed guards in the courtroom violated Defendants state and federal rights to a
fair trial.
2.

The trial court improperly denied Defendants for cause challenges to

potential jurors.
3.

The trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial when the

State violated the Order not to refer to the Defendants status as punitive isolation
on lockdown inmates.
4.

The trial court erred in refusing to allow Defendants a pre-sentence

report and in ordering consecutive sentences.

ARGUMENT

Point I:

The trial court violated Fernandez's right to a fair trial by
permitting excessive courtroom security.

Defendants filed a Motion in Limine seeking to prohibit unnecessary
courtroom security and to have the state detail and justify its proposed security
plan(R-41,6).
A hearing was held immediately prior to the trial at which time the state
alleged Fernandez said he would escape if the opportunity presented itself and that
a third inmate with an escape conviction was going to testify. The State contended
that a screening apron on the front of counsel table would present the jury from
seeing the shackles (TR-7-9).
7

It was explained that Fernandez had stated that he would escape from a
work release program because he did not want to participate in work release (TR10). The Court was advised the third inmate would not be called in as witness
(TR-10).
The Court having determined that the Defendant's were wearing leg irons
ruled,
I can't see them. I can't see why the jury would be able to see'em
and so the prejudice is virtually nonexistent. There exists a possibility that
a juror might see them, but these are jurors that are gonna know these guys
are in jail anyway. There're not gonna be shocked by, ah, catching a
glimpse of leg irons, even if that should happen. So I'm gonna keep'em in
leg irons. I think there's a need for protection here.
The State did not disclose that armed, uniformed guards would be present
in the Courtroom. The Court did not authorize the same.
Following jury selection, counsel for Fernandez and Madsen objected to the
presence of two armed uniformed officers in the courtroom, one seated directly
behind the Defendants (TR-69).
The Court then ruled that the guard's presence was necessary and
appropriate (TR-69).
The Utah Supreme Court has recently ruled on the balance between the
need for courtroom security and a Defendants constitutional rights to a fair trial.
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT2,2002 Utah Lexis 4.
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In Daniels, the trial court ordered the defendant, charged with co-defendant
Kell in the capital prison murder of a third inmate, Blackmon, to be tried in the
prison courtroom because
(1) defendant participated in the planning and attack of Blackmon; (2)
officers found a handcuff key in defendant's cell after the attack; (3)
defendant made racially-related threats after the attack; (4) officers
overheard banging and grinding noises, followed by a toilet flushing after
the attack; (5) defendant threw urine on a prison control officer and said
"This is for you...for testifying against me in court"; (6) defendant was
involved in a prison riot in 1993, during which inmates destroyed property
and removed a steel door from a shower room and used it as a battering ram
to break down the door between the unit and the hallway around the control
room; (7) excluding witnesses, at least twenty-three non-inmate citizens
would be present at trial and (8) defendant Kell would likely testify at trial.
In its order, the trail court described the three courtrooms in Sanpete
County and explained that of the two located in Manti, only the smaller
courtroom has adequate seating for fourteen jurors. The Department of
Corrections presented a security plan for trying the case in this courtroom
insisting that defendant be shackled, but proposing that a floor-length fabric
be places around counsel table to conceal the shackles from the jury. This
option would also have involved two plain-clothed security officers near
defendant and others in the courtroom. Because of the size and security
concerns presented by this courtroom, the Department of Corrections
recommended that the trial be conducted inside the prison facility.
Id. at paragraph 19, n.2.
In assessing the propriety of the trial court's order on appeal, the court
began by reviewing the basic federal constitutional law:

The right to a fair trial is a fundamental constitutional right secured
by the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Central to this right "is the principle that one
accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined
solely on the basis of the evidence introduces at trial, and not on grounds of
.. .other circumstances not introduced as proof at trial." The presumption of
innocence is a component of this guarantee of the right to a fair trial and has
become a basic element of our criminal justice system, Even though the
9

trial judge has broad latitude to control and manage the proceedings to
preserve the integrity of the trial process when a courtroom action or
arrangement in challenged as inherently prejudicial, we consider whether
the practice presents an unacceptable risk of bringing into play
impermissible factors that might erode the presumption of innocence. If the
challenged practice is not inherently prejudicial, the judgment of the trial
court will be affirmed. If the practice is inherently prejudicial, we must
then consider whether the prejudicial practice is outweighed by any
competing essential state interests.
Id. at paragraph 20 (citations omitted).
As in Daniels, the jury in the instant case knew that Fernandez was a State
inmate through the essential facts presented during the case.

Regardless,

shackling the Defendant and allowing armed uniformed law enforcement officers
in the courtroom was prejudicial and eroded the presumption of innocence.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this undermining of the
presumption of innocence in State v. Young, 853 P. 2d 327 (Utah 1993).
Although the Young decision condoned Defendants restraint, it did so only after
an analysis if the specific fact situation of that case held that trial courts needed the
need for security against the potential prejudice in each case Id at 350-1.
The Daniels cases, Supra also supports the contention that the presence of
the uniformed officers was prejudicial to Defendants and in a manner
distinguishable from other indicia of his status as an inmate.
The chief feature that distinguishes the use of identifiable security
officers from courtroom practices we might find inherently prejudicial is
the wider range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw from the
officers' presence. While shackling and prison clothes are unmistakable
indications of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large,
the presence of guards at a defendant's trial need not be interpreted as a
sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable. Jurors may just as easily
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believe that the officers are there to guard against disruptions emanating
from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do
not erupt into violence. Indeed, it is entirely possible that jurors will not
infer anything at all from the presence of the guards. If they are placed at
some distance from the accused, security officers may well be perceived
more as elements of an impressive drama than as reminders of the
defendant's special status. Our society has become insured to the presence
of armed guards in most public places; they are doubtless taken for granted
so long as their numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular official
concern or alarm. See Hardee v. Kuhlman, 581 F. 2d 330, 332 (CA2 1978).
To be sure, it is possible that the sight of a security force within the
courtroom might under certain conditions "create the impression in the
minds of the jury that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy."
Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F. 2d 101, 108 (CA6 1973), cert denied, 416
U.S. 959 (1974). However, "reason, principle, and common human
experience." Williams, supra, at 504, counsel against presumption that any
use of identifiable security guards in the courtroom is inherently
prejudicial. In view of the variety of ways in which such guards can be
deployed, we believe that a case-by-case approach is more appropriate.
475 U.S. at 569 (Emphasis added).
The Kennedy case cited by Holbrook further explains,
A second category of cases involving the indicia of innocence pertains to an
excessive number of guards in the courtroom during a criminal trial. The
general rule derived from these decisions is that a defendant has a right to
be tried in an atmosphere free of partiality created by the use of excessive
guards except where special circumstances, which in the discretion of the
trial judge, dictate added security precautions. One reason underlying this
right is that guards seated around or next to the defendant during a jury trial
are likely to crate the impression in the minds of the jury that the defendant
is dangerous or untrustworthy. Also the placement of guards in relation to
the defendant could materially interfere with his ability to consult with
counsel. However, the use of guards for security purposes, when wisely
employed, provides the best means for protecting a defendant's fair trial
right and only in rare cases would greater security precautions be
warranted. Since guards can be strategically places in the courtroom when
more than normal security is needed and can be hidden in plainclothes, the
jury never needs to be aware of the added protection so that no prejudice
would adhere to the defendant. These cases provide an excellent point of
comparison since they illustrate oftentimes-extreme situations, which were
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adequately handled without the need for the much more drastic and
prejudicial step of shackling.
Kennedy, 487 F. 2d 108-109 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Point II:

The trial court erred in denying the for-cause challenge of
potential jurors.

During the jury selection process one juror indicated a close relationship
with law enforcement officials in San Juan County. Ms. Bradford revealed that
her son is an officer with the Blanding City Police but that she could be fair (TR35). Jason Jones reveled that he had a close working relationship with one of the
States witnesses, working with him once or twice a month in the Search and
Rescue for San Juan County (TR 44-5). Mr. Jones further had an attorney client
relationship with Craig Halls, the Prosecutor. Mr. Halls had done some estate
work for Mr. Jones (TR-46). Mr. Jones thinks a lot about his association with
attorney Halls (TR-47).
Counsel approached the bench for an off the record discussion of the jurors
and to challenge for cause (TR-53). Subsequently the Court allowed Fernandez's
attorney to question Mr. Jones directly. Mr. Jones admitted he would be more
likely to believe Mr. Halls because he knew him and did not know Fernandez's
attorney (TR-55).
Both counsel reiterated their challenges made at sidebar and Judge
Anderson passed the jury for cause (TR-57). After the panel had been selected the
court and counsel made a record of the bench conference. Fernandez's attorney
stated his motion to strike Juror Jones for cause (TR-66). Madsen's counsel noted
12

she had objected for cause to all the jurors who had indicated an affiliation or
positive feeling for law enforcement (TR-67). The panel members objected to
were identified as Daniel Brandt; Dennis Anderson; Loretta Bradford Stacy
Cressler; and Jones. Madsen's attorney used two of her preemptory strikes to
remove Bradford and Cressler. Fernandez's attorney used a peremptory challenge
to remove Jones. (TR-67). (The court allowed each side four challenges to a
sixteen-member panel. Defendants counsel exercised their challenges jointly (TR57)).
Prior to State v. Menzies, 889 P. 2d 393 (Utah 1994), a criminal Defendant
in Utah was entitled to a reversal whenever he was compelled to exercise a
peremptory challenge to remove a panel member who should have been stricken
for cause. Id. at 398, citing State v. Bishop, 753, P. 2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988).
Since Menzies the Utah rule has been that the loss of peremptory challenge does
not automatically create a loss of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.
Rather the Defendant is required to show actual prejudice. He must show that a
member of the jury was partial or incompetent. Menzies, at 398 citing Hopt v.
Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887).
The requirement that a Defendant prove or at least assert that he faced a
partial or biased jury was upheld in State v. Carter, 888 P. 2d 629, 649 (Utah
1995), holding such failure to be harmless error. However, the Supreme Court
acting under its supervisory powers then went on to address its concern on trial
courts passing jurors when legitimate concerns had been raised during voir dire
13

about their suitably. The Court stated "If a party raises legitimate questions as to a
potential juror's beliefs, biases or physical ability to serve, the potential juror
should be struck for cause, even when it would be legally erroneous to refuse/' Id
at 650. Admittedly this admonition is directed specifically towards capital cases,
but its rationale extends beyond.
Further erosion of the Menzies standard is found in State v. Saunders, 992
P. 2d 951 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court distinguished the fact situation
from Menzies, holding that ruling "did not foreclose all considerations of
erroneous for-cause rulings in determining whether there is sufficient prejudice in
the circumstances of the case to require a reversal of a conviction. Id at 965.
As in Saunders, the juror Jones expressed a belief that he was
"uncomfortable" in deciding this case, at least to the extent that he favored the
State's counsel for reasons that went beyond anything Defendants could do to
cure. As in Saunders, given this attitude, the jurors should have been removed.
As in Saunders, the trial courts refusal to strike the juror is reversible error.
Point III:

The trial erred in not granting a mistrial for the
introduction of evidence of the Defendant's status as lockdown inmates in violation of its in limine motion to
exclude such testimony,

Madsen joined in a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence of his status as a
lock down prisoner at trial (R-34-40).

Judge Anderson granted the Motion and

Ordered the State not to inform the jurors that Defendants were kept in a punitive
or high security area of the jail (TR-14, 15).
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Flaunting that Order, Troy Butler, a jail officer, testified that the
Defendants were in punitive isolation lockdown cells (TR-171). In response to
objections taken by counsel for both Defendants the State indicated it had wanted
Butler to testify to clarify that no one else had access to the flooded cells (TR174). After the court opinioned such testimony could have been obtained without
reference to the punitive isolation (TR-175) counsel moved for mistrial (TR-173,
176). The Court denied the motion holding such testimony not prejudicial in light
of other derogatory testimony about Defendants (TR-182-3).
Fernandez's contends that contrary to the Courts ruling, such evidence was
unduly prejudicial and violated his rights to affair trial under case law and Utah
Ruled Of Evidence.
See e.g. State v. Saunders, 992, P. 2d 951 (Utah 1999),
It is fundamental in our law that a person may be convicted
criminally only for his acts, not his general character. That principle is
violated if a conviction is based on an inference that conviction is justified
because of the defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit bad
acts. The admission of evidence of prior crimes may have such a powerful
tendency to mislead the finder of facts as to subvert the constitutional
principle that a defendant may be convicted only if guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of a specific crime charged.
1999 Utah 59 at paragraph 15.
Utah Rule of Evidence 404.
(b)
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. In other
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words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a
non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court was clearly correct in its ruling to
exclude the evidence and erred in denying a mistrial. Admission of the evidence
of the punitive isolation and lockdown, enhanced by the shackles and excessive
courtroom security, so likely prejudiced the jury it cannot be said the Defendants
had a fair trial. The Court's ruling meets the "plainly wrong" standard of State v.
DeCorso, 993 P. 2d 837 (Utah 1999). Defendants should be granted a new trial.

Point IV:

The trial erred in refusing to order a pre-sentence report.

After Defendants were convicted, both counsel requested pre-sentence
reports (TR-251-2). Counsel requested that the same be prepared and prior to
sentencing due to difficulties in obtaining copies of the reports or convincing a
court it has jurisdiction to correct errors in the reports (TR-251).

Despite

acknowledging the validity of these arguments, the court denied the request
because he could not imagine anything a pre-sentence report would contain that
would convince him to place Fernandez on probation (TR-252). Fernandez was
sentenced to five years in the Utah State Prison to be served consecutively with the
sentence he was already serving. However, the position ignores the other purpose
a Pre-sentence report serves other than convincing a trial court to grant probation.
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As the record in this case demonstrates (TR-251-2), and the cases
interpreting Section 77-18-1 U.C.A. the Utah sentencing statute recognize, the
Pre-sentence report is used by the Board of Pardons in setting release dates. As
such, Defendants have a right to review and correct their reports. See e.g. State v.
Jaeger, 973 P. 2d 404 (Utah 1999); Section 64-13-20 U.C.A.
There is no legitimate criteria by which trial court should be enrolled to
decide what Defendants should or shouldn't receive pre-sentence reports. This is
especially true in the instant case where consecutive sentences have been imposed.
The Board of Pardons needs to have an accurate report it issue fairness and
accuracy in setting Fernandez's parole date.

CONCLUSION
This Court should order a new fair trial.

DATED this 18th day of March 2002.

6/vg^A Jy
WILLIAM L. SCHULXZ
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the foregoing
Opening Brief of Appellant to Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, 160 E. 300
South 6th Floor, Heber Wells Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 and Happy
Morgan, Attorney for Madsen, 8 South 100 East, Moab, Utah 84532, postage
prepaid, this 18th day of March 2002.

William L. Schult\

18

7

Addendum A

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San .Jupn County

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
San Juan County Attorney
P. 0. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone: (435)587-2128
Fax No. (435)587-3119

•*-&

NOV G'3 200:

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER
OF COMMITMENT TO
UTAH STATE PRISON

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 0117-97

FELIX G. FERNANDEZ
Defendant.

Case Judge: Lyle R. Anderson

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That the Defendant is forthwith remanded to the custody of the San Juan County Sheriff
for transportation to the Utah State Prison and execution to the sentence given herein.
There being no legal or other reason why sentence should not be imposed, and defendant having
been convicted of the offense(s) of:
Count 1: DAMAGING A JAIL, a third degree felony
Defendant being now present in court and ready for sentence and represented by William
L. Schultz, defendant is now adjudged guilty of the above offense(s) and is now sentenced to a
term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five years; such sentence is to run consecutively with
sentence he is already serving.

DATED this 9AU

day of

M?l^^^

LyleR^Anderson
District Court Judge
ATTES1

^S^jui/icU \Xr?\fpti{^(,
Clerk/ofithe Court

>

2W

\
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered a true copy of the
foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT to William L. Schultz, Attorney
for the defendant; Adult Probation Department at 1165 South Highway 191 #3, Moab, UT
84532; and to the Department of Corrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020

DATED this ^

day ct^r\n)jL/.srrJH!h)

.

^nO/.

Addendum B

Utah Code Ann. §64-13-20
(1) The department shall:
(a) provide investigative and diagnostic services and prepare reports to:
(i) assist the courts in sentencing;
(ii) assist the Board of Pardons and Parole in its decisionmaking responsibilities regarding
offenders;
(iii) assist the department in managing offenders; and
(iv) assure the professional and accountable management of the department;
(b) establish standards for providing investigative and diagnostic services based on
available resources, giving priority to felony cases;
(c) employ staff for the purpose of conducting:
(i) thorough presentence investigations of the social, physical, and mental conditions and
backgrounds of offenders;
(ii) examinations when required by the court or the Board of Pardons and Parole; and
(iii) thorough diagnostic evaluations of offenders as the court finds necessary to
supplement the presentence investigation report under Section 76-3-404.
(2) The department may provide recommendations concerning appropriate measures to be
taken regarding offenders.
(3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports prepared by the
department are protected as defined in Section 63-2-304 and after sentencing may not be
released except by express court order or by rules made by the Department of Corrections,
(b) The reports are intended only for use by:
(i) the court in the sentencing process;
(ii) the Board of Pardons and Parole in its decisionmaking responsibilities; and
(iii) the department in the supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender.
(4) Presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports shall be made available
upon request to other correctional programs within the state if the offender who is the
subject of the report has been committed or is being evaluated for commitment to the
facility for treatment as a condition of probation or parole.
(5) (a) The presentence investigation reports shall include a victim impact statement in all
felony cases and in misdemeanor cases if the defendant caused bodily harm or death to the
victim.
(b) Victim impact statements shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense;
(iii) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense, and the seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result
of the offense;
(v) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the victim or the victim's
family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim or
the victim's family that the court requires.
(6) If the victim is deceased; under a mental, physical, or legal disability; or otherwise
unable to provide the information required under this section, the information may be
obtained from the personal representative, guardian, or family members, as necessary.
(7) The department shall employ staff necessary to pursue investigations of complaints
from the public, staff, or offenders regarding the management of corrections programs.

A person wno wiuruny and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods,
or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of
the third degree.
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77,
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or
offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the
defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of
class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is with
the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is
vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services shall be
provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment
prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the
supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider
appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise the
probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct
presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the
department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with
department standards.

defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time
for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation reportfromthe department or
information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement describing
the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. The victim impact statement
shall:
(i) identify all victims of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of complete restitution as
defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a recommendationfromthe
department regarding the payment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 763-201(4) by the defendant;
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense along with
its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result
of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the victim's
family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim or
the victim's family and any information required by Section 77-38a-203 that is relevant to
the trial court's sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary
damages, accompanied by a recommendationfromthe department regarding the payment
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4).
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council or for use by the department.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's
attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for
review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior
to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may
grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with
the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court
shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the
time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate
sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on
record and in the presence of the defendant.

(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the
defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court
finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory
service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance with
Subsection 76-3-201(4); and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5,1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on
probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection
(8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section
76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 77-276(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and any
extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon

completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor
cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant
on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account
receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer responsibility
to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay
should not be treated as contempt of court.
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt Collection,
and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of
supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details
on outstanding accounts receivable.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation
of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the
probationer is exonerated at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance
of an order to show cause or warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by
the probationer or upon a hearing and afindingin court that the probationer has violated
the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and afindingthat the
conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon thefilingof an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine
if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause why
his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be

served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of arightto be represented by
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of arightto present evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall
present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based
shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for
good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present
evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term
commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously
imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division of
Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of
sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has
certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefitfromtreatment at the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are
classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access
and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records
Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose
the presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department for
purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender;

(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's
authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report or
the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall
include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the
crime on the victim or the victim's household.
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement,
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in accordance
with Subsection (16).
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as
described in this section until further order of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's compliance
with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant and
install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the
department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring
only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either
directly or by contract with a private provider.
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-203
Applicability:

This rule shall apply to all courts, the Department of Corrections, state prosecutors and
criminal defense attorneys.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Presentence investigation reports shall be completed by order of the court as provided in
Utah Code Ann. Sections 77-18-1 and 64-13-20. Presentence reports shall either be
physically removed from the case file and kept in a separate storage area or retained in the
case file in a sealed envelope marked "Controlled."
(2) Full disclosure of the presentence investigation report shall be made to defense counsel,
or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel, and to the prosecutor unless
disclosure of the presentence report would jeopardize the life or safety of third parties. The
presentence investigation report shall be made available to prosecutors and defense counsel
or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel at least three working days
in advance of the scheduled sentencing date at the local office of the Department of
Corrections or such other location as ordered by the court. The presentence report shall also
be made available to prosecutors, defense counsel and the defendant at the court on the date
of sentencing. In cases where a party or a party's counsel notifies the court clerk, in writing,
that the presentence investigation report is the subject of an appeal, the clerk shall include
the sealed presentence investigation report as part of the record.

Utah Rule of Evidence 401
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 402
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by
these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.
Utah Rule of Evidence 403
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence
Utah Rule of Evidence 404
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or
by the prosecution to rebut the same;

(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the victim was thefirstaggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607,
608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a
non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.

